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Cagle: Cagle: Search and Seizure--the Destruction or Removal of Evidence
RECENT CASES

SEARCH AND SEIZURE-THE DESTRUCTION OR
REMOVAL OF EVIDENCE EXCEPTION TO THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT ADOPTED IN MISSOURI
State v. Wdey'
An anonymous informant told police that narcotics were stored in
the refrigerator of an apartment in Missouri and would be removed to
Illinois within a short time. Police officers immediately "staked out" the
apartment. An officer reported known drug users in the neighborhood as
well as a car with an Illinois license that drove into the apartment building parking lot and quickly left upon noticing the officer. The police
and prosecutor attempted to contact two judges to obtain a search warrant,
but were unsuccessful. 2 Police subsequently entered the apartment without a
warrant and arrested all of the occupants including defendant Wiley. Immediately thereafter an officer went "straight to the back door [to admit
other officers] and then straight to the ice box."3 Drugs were found in
the refrigerator and seized. No other search of the apartment was made.
At trial defendant's motion to suppress the drugs was overruled and
he was convicted. 4 The Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, affirmed. 5 The case was transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court, which
affirmed the conviction. The court held the warrantless search, although
not sustainable as incident to arrest, was valid on two grounds: (1) a search
warrant was not required because the possibility of destruction or removal of evidence presented "exigent circumstances;"6 and (2) a warrantless search could be conducted immediately after arrest to confirm anonymous information and determine whether the suspects should be detained
or released.7
The fourth amendment generally requires that police obtain a warrant
before searching a dwelling.8 The United States Supreme Court has, however, recognized "a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement."9 The exceptions are justified by the
1. 522 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
2. The court did not indicate why the attempts were unsuccessful.
3. 522 S.W.2d at 285.
4. Id. at 284.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 290.
7. Id. at 291.
8. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971); Vale v. Louisiana,
399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925). The rationale of the warrant requirement is to balance the competing interests of police officers engaged in solving
crimes against the expected right of privacy in the home. McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); accord, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761
(1969). Invalidly seized evidence is excluded even though there was probable
cause to search. Agnello v. United States, supra at 33; accord, Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, supra at 449; Chimel v. California, supra at 762.
9. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971); Chimel v. CaliPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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presence of tinusual or exigent circumstances. 10 Common exceptions include "search. incident to arrest,"'1 L "stop and frisk,"' 2 and "hot pursuit
of a- fleeing felon."'13 A relatively unknown exception has recently been, the
subject of voluminous litigation: the destruction or removal of evidence
exception.
The destruction/removal exception provides that police may search and
seize without a warrant in order to keep tangible evidence from being destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction. Only recently has this exception
been needed. Before the 1969 decision in Chimel v. California,14 the search
incident to arrest exception was broad enough to include warrantless
searches of entire dwellings and thus include most situations where the
destruction/removal exception is now used.' 3 Chimel, however, narrowed
the scope of search incident to arrest to the area within the suspect's immediate control.' 6 The destruction/removal exception allows the broader
17
pre-Chimel search under the proper circumstances.
The Supreme Court has never ruled explicitly on the destruction/removal exception.' 8 Proponents of the exception point to dicta,19 bases for
other exceptions, 20 and Schmerber v. California2 ' to show that the Court
has, in effect, recognized the exception. In Schmerber the police arrested
defendant for driving while intoxicated and took a blood sample over objection. The Court held that the warrantless search was valid because the
delay necessary to get a search warrant would have "threatened the 'destruction of evidence' " 2 2-i.e., alcohol in blood would diminish with time.
fornia, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
10. For instance, the "search incident to arrest" exception has been created
to allow the police to seize weapons that could be used to effect escape or seize
evidence that could be destroyed. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
The basis for the "moving vehicle" exception is the possibility of removal of the
suspect car from the jurisdiction before a warrant can be issued. Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
11. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
12. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
13. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
14. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (business office);
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (four-room apartment).
16. 395 U.S. at 768.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Blake, 484 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 949 (1974).
18. Id. at 54; United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 833 (1973); Note, Police Practices and the Threatened Destruction of
Tangible Evidence, 84 HAsv. L. Rxv. 1465, 1468 (1971).
19. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964); Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610, 615 (1961); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951);
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
20. See authorities cited note 9 supra.
21. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
22. Id. at 770.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/12
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::Opponents point to cases where the Court has had the opportunity to
use the destruction/removal exception, but has instead chosen to invalidate
the .search.23 In Vale v. Louisiana2 4 defendant sold narcotics to the driver
of a-car in front of defendant's apartment. The police arrested him- as he
tried to get back inside and subsequently entered the apartment and conducted a full warrantless search. Had the search not been conducted then,
the defendant's mother and brother, who were in the apartment, might
have destroyed the evidence. 25 The Court noted that the Louisiana Supreme Court approved the search on the grounds that "it involved narcotics, which are easily removed, hidden, or destroyed." 26 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court held the search invalid because it did not come within any
recognized exception to the warrant requirement.27 Chimel v. Califo'rnia2 g
contained similar reasoning. In Chimel the defendant was arrested for
burglary of a coin shop. A police officer completely searched defendant's
house and seized coins later used to convict defendant. The Court held
that the search was too broad to be allowed under the search incident to
arrest exception. The dissent argued that the search should have been upheld because the defendant's wife, who was present at the arrest, could
have removed the evidence.2 9 The majority opinion, however, did not
comment on this argument.80
Federal appellate courts have generally accepted the destruction/removal exception,31 and have examined a number of factors to be con-

23.

THE MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNAIENT PROCEDURE §.

SS 260.5, Comment

(Proposed Official Draft No. 5, 1975), rejects the destruction/removal exception,
stating: "[I]f Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), is still good law as
the Vale case, 399 U.S. 30 (1970), indicates, such a provision [destruction/removal
exception] would be unconstitutional." In Agnello the defendant's dwelling was
searched without a warrant and the narcotics found were used at his trial. The
government argued that the "moving vehicle" exception should be extended to
premises. The Court stated:
While the question has never been directly decided by this court,
it has always been assumed that one's house cannot lawfully be searched
without a search warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein.
269 U.S. at 32.
24. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
25. Id. at 33.

26. Id. at 34.
27. Id. at 33-35.
28. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
29. Id. at 775.
30. The majority might have thought that the evidence was unmovable
because of the probability of police surveillance of defendant's dwelling while
obtaining a warrant. If the wife tried to leave with the coins, she could have been
searched without a warrant under the search incident to arrest or the moving
vehicle exceptions. See text accompanying notes 41-42 infra.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Blake, 484 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 949 (1974); United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 947 (1972);
Gaines v. Craven, 448 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Pino, 431 F.2d
1043 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 989 (1971); Piva v. United States, 387
F.2d 609 (ist Cir. 1967).
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sidered in determining whether the exception should apply: 32 (1)'whether
there is time to obtain a warrant before removal or destruction of the evidence; 33 (2)' whether the belief that the evidence is about to be removed
or destroyed is reasonable; 34 (3) whether police would be endangered by
impounding defendants or the place of search until a warrant is obtained; 35 (4)-whether the suspects are likely to know that they or the evidence are under surveillance; 3 6 (5) whether the suspects will discover that
they are under surveillance; 37 (6) whether police contribute to the exigency
of the situation; 38 and (7) whether the particular type of evidence is
easily destroyed. 30
In Wiley the first and principal ground relied on by the majority was
"exigent circumstances." The exigent circumstance was the possible destruction or removal of narcotics from Missouri before police could obtain a warrant. Thus, the Missouri Supreme Court, in effect, adopted the
destruction/removal exception to the warrant requirement. The dissent did
not dispute the validity of the destruction/removal exception, but contended tht- the majority failed to establish an immediate danger of re40
moval or destruction under the facts of this case.
32. Word formulas such as "threatened with imminent removal or destruction" are frequently used.: See, e.g., United States v. Blake, 484 F.2d 50, 54 (8th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 949 ,(1974). This leaves the standards for determining whether evidence is in danger of removal or destruction-i.e., when the
destruction/removal exception can be used, hinging on subjective definitions of
"threatened" and "imminent." The key facts that are discussed in the cases present

a much more -precise way of determining when the exception is applicable. See
United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262; 268 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 8.3

(1978).
33. United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026, 1030-31 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Pino, 431 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 989 (1971).
34. United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 269 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
833 (1973); United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026, 1031 (3d Cir. 1972); Gaines v.
Craven, 448 F.2d 1236, 1237 (9th Cir. 1971); Theobald v. United States, 571 F.2d
769, 771 (9th Cir. 1967).

35. ,United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 1974) (dictum);
United States v. Pino, 431 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir. 1970), cert denied, 402 U.S. 989
(1971).
36. United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 269 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
833 (1973); United States v. Doyle, 456 F.2d 1246, 1247 (5th Cir. 1972).
37. United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 80, 35 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 8-9 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974).
38. United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627, 629-31 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30, 34 (9th Cir. 1974) (dictum).
39. United States v. Cushnie, 488 F.2d 81, 82 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 968 (1974) (dictum); United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026, 1031-32 (3d Cir.
1972); United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992, 998-99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 995 (1971).
40. The Wiley majority cited United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973), and United States v. Blake, 484 F.2d 50 (8th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 949 (1974), to support the "exigent circumstances"
argument. 522 S.W.2d at 290, 294. In Rubin defendant picked up narcotics under
surveillance by the police and took them to a dwelling where others were seen
coming and going. Defendant left and police stopped him when they feared that
he had detected their surveillance. He yelled in a neighborhood where he was
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The search in Wiley is excused from the warrant requirement by the
destruction/removal exception only if narcotics found by the police were
in danger of removal or destruction. The Missouri Supreme Court never
stated the facts that indicated that the narcotics were about to be removed
or destroyed, but nevertheless concluded that the destruction/renoval excepion was applicable. Only inferences from two facts in Wiley, however,
could have suggested destruction or removal: (1) the drugs might be removed to Illinois according to the informant's tip; or (2) the drugs might
be destroyed because the driver of the car that pulled into and quickly left
the apartment building parking lot might call and warn the occupants of
the apartment. As to the possibility of the drugs being removed to Illinois,
there was time to get a warrant before removal. i 1 The police could have
waited to obtain a warrant because the occupants of the apartment were
under surveillance. If they tried to go to Illinois, the drugs could be seized
under the "moving vehicle" or "search incident to arrest" exceptions. As to
the possibility of the evidence being destroyed, there was not time to
obtain a warrant. 42 Furthermore, the narcotics could easily have been destroyed. 43 However, the belief that the narcotics were about to be destroyed was not reasonable 44 under the circumstances, because the only
fact supporting that belief is that a car left a parking lot. In addition, the
police contributed to the exigency of the situation45 by conducting surveillance in a marked police car. The police-created exigency and the unreasonable belief that evidence was about to be destroyed far outweigh
well known, "Call my brother." His conviction was upheld. The yell could reasonably have been interpreted as a signal to destroy evidence directed to the other
people that were with the narcotics. In addition, an attempt had been made to
get a warrant. In Blake police went to defendant's dwelling with an arrest warrant,

but the back door "stake-out" officer saw someone (not defendant) start to throw
a white change purse. The court found that the police had probable cause to

believe that the change purse contained narcotics. Because the police otherwise
would have had to leave the stranger with the purse that he had already tried
to destroy, the court held the police were justified in a warrantless search that
found the purse containing narcotics down a clothes chute.
The dissent in Wiley argued that the facts of Wiley resembled those of Vale
and that the holding in Vale should be controlling. 522 S.W.2d at 296. The dissent
pointed out that in Blake the "federal agents virtually saw the defendant throw
the narcotics down the clothes chute." Furthermore, the dissent pointed out that
because the stranger in Blake was not under arrest, the delay in getting a warrant
would have been fatal. Id. at 297. The dissent emphasized that in Rubin "[t]he
agents know that at least one other person, who was not in custody had been left
at the defendant's dwelling ....
Id. The dissent summarized by saying:
The Blake and Rubin cases thus demonstrate emergency situations
where there is a very real threat of destruction or removal of evidence
by persons not in custody with access to the contraband. In this case there
was no such threat.
Id. at 296.
41. See.note 30 and accompanying text supra.
42. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
43. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
44. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
45. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
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